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ABSTRACT. The recent history regarding the analysis of knowledge is examined, in the 
context of the so-called ‘Gettier problem’. The issues that are explored include: (i) the 
nature of the Gettier problem itself, and the particular conception of the ‘traditional’ 
analysis of knowledge that it presupposes; (ii) why the Gettier problem is not amenable to 
a straightforward solution; (iii) some of the core motivations for rejecting the ‘analytical 
project’ of trying to offering an analysis of knowledge; and (iv) some recent virtue-
theoretic solutions that have been offered to the analytical project.  
 




1. THE ANALYTICAL PROJECT IN EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
For much of the last fifty years, the project of offering an analysis of propositional knowledge 
was thought to be central to the epistemological enterprise. Call this the analytical project, for 
short. The reason why this project came to the fore of epistemological discussion around fifty 
years ago is of course due to the famous article by Edmund Gettier (1963) which 
demonstrated that the traditional tripartite account of knowledge in terms of justified true 
belief was unsustainable. In countering the tripartite account, Gettier also cemented the idea 
that there was indeed a traditional account of knowledge in the literature along just the lines 
that he sets out in his critique of it. This might well be contentious, so let us first pause to 
explore a little what is supposedly involved in the ‘traditional’ tripartite account.   
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 In what follows, I will take it as entirely uncontentious that knowledge entails truth, in 
the sense that it is factive⎯if one knows that p, then p is true. It is also reasonably 
uncontentious that knowledge entails belief⎯or at least some sort of belief-like propositional 
attitude⎯in the sense that if one knows that p, then one believes that p.1 We should thus focus 
our attention on the third condition in the tripartite analysis, the justification condition. 
Gettier himself says very little about this condition. He attributes it to Roderick Chisholm 
(1957, 16) and to A. J. Ayer (1956), though in both cases he grants that they do not quite use 
the terminology of ‘justification’ themselves, writing instead (respectively) in terms of the 
knowing subject having ‘adequate evidence’ for their belief in the target proposition or 
‘having the right to be sure’ that the target proposition is true.2 What seems to be the 
common thread here as far as Gettier is concerned is that knowledge requires true belief that 
is supported by good reasons that the subject can offer in favour of the truth of her belief.  
Crucially, however, it is also vital to the counterexamples that Gettier offers to the 
tripartite account, as he himself notes, that justification cannot itself be factive (i.e., one can 
have a justified belief that p and yet p be false). This is important because so-called Gettier-
style cases essentially involve a subject justifiably believing a proposition in a manner that 
would have ordinarily resulted in a false belief, but where the subject ends up with a true 
belief regardless, albeit one that is completely disconnected from the justification.  
To take one of Gettier’s own examples, suppose that one has a good justification for 
believing that p is true, when it fact it is false. Now imagine that one infers from p the 
(inclusive) disjunction, either p or q, where q is a proposition which one has no reason for 
thinking is true. Normally, inferring a disjunction in this way would lead to a false belief (i.e., 
where one’s original belief is in fact false, and where one is adding a disjunct that one has no 
reason to think is true). Nonetheless, one’s belief ought to be justified, at least if the original 
belief that p is justified, as if one has good reasons for thinking that p is true, then one also has 
good reasons for thinking that p or q is true. All we now need to do is stipulate that the 
inferred disjunction is true, on account of q being true (unbeknownst to our subject). Hey 
presto, we now have a justified true belief, where the truth of the belief is completely 
disconnected from the original justification (which, recall, was a justification for thinking that 
p, and hence that p or q, is true).  
We will examine the structure of Gettier-style cases a little more thoroughly in a 
moment. First, I want to reflect on whether Gettier is right to suppose that it was widely 
accepted, prior to his article, that knowledge has been analysed along these particular 
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tripartite lines. In fact, there is reason to be sceptical of this claim, as it seems far from 
straightforward that pre-Gettier epistemologists would have been happy to accept a 
conception of justification that was compatible with the target belief being false. Ayer, for 
example, sets out his position in opposition to what he refers to as the ‘quest for certainty’, 
which would suggest that he took the standard view to be much more demanding than his 
own. Moreover, there is a clear philosophical tradition, at least in the UK, of treating 
knowledge as involving an infallible grasp of the truth.3 This is a tradition that goes back at 
least to the writings of John Cook Wilson (which have been tremendously influential on 
twentieth century British philosophy) and those directly influenced by him, such as H. A. 
Prichard.4 Accordingly, it might plausibly be argued that the tripartite account of knowledge 
that Gettier attacked with his counterexamples was in fact not the standard view at all. 
Moreover, notice that the idea that knowledge involves an infallible grasp of the truth appears 
to go hand-in-hand with a conception of justification which is similarly infallible, and which 
would thus be completely unaffected by Gettier-style counterexamples. On this view, after all, 
the agents in Gettier-style cases are not justified in what they believe, precisely because their 
justification is compatible with the falsity of what they believe.5  
Even so, one can see why those who initially responded to Gettier’s article in the mid-
1960s were willing to grant that justification must be understood along fallibilist lines. 
Wouldn’t such an infallibilist conception of justification lead directly to radical scepticism, 
and hence be unsustainable?6 In that case, the stark choice facing those responding to 
Gettier’s counterexamples seems to either be to endorse an infallibilist conception of 
justification, and so deal with the very real threat of radical scepticism, or else embrace a 
fallibilist conception of justification and inherit the problem of offering an adequate analysis 
of knowledge that Gettier-style cases expose.  
In any case, what is clear from the post-Gettier literature is that commentators very 
quickly took on board the idea that justification must be understood along fallibilist lines, and 
hence that the ‘traditional’ tripartite conception of knowledge was as Gettier described. For 
example, if one were to open an epistemology textbook written from a post-Getter 
perspective, then one would expect to see the tripartite account of knowledge being described 
just as Gettier described it. Moreover, we see this point in action in terms of the initial wave 
of responses to Gettier counterexamples, which involve not a renewed defence of an 
infallibilist conception of justification, but rather offer ways of effectively bolstering the 
tripartite account that has a fallibilist conception of justification at its core.7 With this point in 
mind, let us look a little closer at the problem that Gettier identifies.   
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2. THE GETTIER PROBLEM 
 
As we saw in the last section, Gettier’s own cases essentially involve an inference, and so one 
natural response to these cases is to suppose that this is where one should focus in trying to fix 
the tripartite account.8 In particular, in the case that we looked at earlier, the subject forms 
her justified true belief in the disjunction by inferring it from a false premise (i.e., her justified 
belief that p). Thus one might suppose that all we need to do to get around the problem is to 
insist that knowledge is justified true belief⎯where justification is still understood along the 
non-factive lines that Gettier attributed to the tripartite account⎯that is not inferred from 
any false premises. This general style of approach to the Gettier problem is known as the no-
false lemmas approach.9 Although initially appealing, it quickly runs into difficulties, and hence 
acts as a good ‘case-study’ when it comes to appreciating why solving the Gettier problem is 
trickier than it looks.  
 The first thing to note is that while Gettier’s own two counterexamples to the 
tripartite account of knowledge essentially involve an inference from a false premise, this 
seems incidental to the general structure of a Gettier-style example. Consider, for example, 
the ‘sheep’ case that Chisholm (1977, 105) offers. Imagine a farmer⎯who we’ll call 
‘Roddy’⎯who is looking into a field and sees what looks to be a sheep. On this basis, Roddy 
comes to justifiably believe that there is a sheep in the field. As it happens, though, what he is 
looking at is not a sheep at all but merely a big hairy dog that looks like a sheep. Ordinarily, 
then, if one were to form this belief on this basis one would end up with a false belief. 
Nonetheless, Roddy has excellent (although fallible) grounds in favour of his belief⎯the big 
hairy dog does, after all, look just like a sheep, and he has no reason to doubt what he 
sees⎯which is why his belief is justified. Moreover, as it happens, Roddy’s belief is true since 
there is a sheep in the field hidden from view behind the big hairy dog. Roddy thus has a 
justified true belief that does not count as knowledge (since one can’t come to know that there 
is a sheep in the field simply by looking at a big hairy dog). 
 Note that there is no essential inference involved in this case⎯Roddy just looks into 
the field and directly forms the belief that there is a sheep in the field. Moreover, notice that 
this case has just the kind of structure of a standard Gettier-style case, in that we effectively 
have good epistemic luck cancelling out bad epistemic luck, such that the target belief is both 
true and justified, but where the latter is completely disconnected from the former. That is, 
the bad epistemic luck that Roddy happens to be looking at a sheep-shaped object rather 
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than an actual sheep is cancelled out by the good epistemic luck that there happens to be a 
genuine sheep in the field. This is why his justification for his belief is disconnected from the 
truth of the belief.10  
 The existence of such cases entails that the no-false lemmas approach will need to be 
much more subtle in order to be effective.11 In particular, it must allow for false assumptions 
that are in some sense operative in the background, even if the subject doesn’t actively 
employ them in an inference. In the case just described, for example, Roddy is falsely 
supposing that what he is looking at is a genuine sheep, even if this is not a premise in his 
reasoning towards his belief that there is a sheep in the field.  
 But the fundamental problem facing any development of the no false lemmas view is 
to offer a principled way of understanding what constitutes a false lemma in this regard which 
is neither too broad as to exclude genuine cases of knowledge, nor too thin as to be unable to 
deal with Gettier-style cases. In order to see the force of the latter horn, notice that one can 
construct Gettier-style cases where the subject is not misled at all, at least in a direct fashion. 
Consider, for example, the famous barn-façade case.12 Here we are to imagine a subject⎯let’s 
call him Barney⎯who looks at a genuine barn in good cognitive conditions, and thereby 
forms the justified true belief that what he is looking at is a barn. The twist in the tail is that 
although this barn is genuine, it is in fact the only genuine barn in the vicinity, all of the 
others apparent barns in fact being mere barn-façades. Had Barney happened to look at any 
of the other apparent barns, then he would have formed a false belief. 
 This case has just the same feature of good epistemic luck cancelling out bad epistemic 
luck that we find in other Gettier-style cases. Barney has the bad epistemic luck to be forming 
a belief that there is a barn before him by looking at the front of the object in an environment 
where this is not a reliable guide as to whether there is a genuine barn there. But this bad 
epistemic luck is cancelled out by the good epistemic luck that he happens to be looking at the 
one genuine barn in the vicinity. Accordingly, his justification for what he believes is 
disconnected from the truth of his belief.  
 But what is the false assumption in play in the barn façade case supposed to be on the 
no false lemmas view? Is Barney really assuming that he is not in barn façade county? 
Moreover, if we do attribute this stance to the proponent of the no false lemmas thesis, then 
the other horn of our dilemma becomes apparent. For if the notion of a false lemma is this 
broad, then isn’t it often the case that when we genuinely come to know propositions there 
will be some false assumptions in play, however tacit? The worry is thus that a lot of our bona 
fide knowledge is now under threat.13 
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 The point of the foregoing is not to suggest that the no false lemmas approach is 
completely unsustainable, but merely to highlight the difficulties involved in dealing with the 
Gettier problem.14 Indeed, I think we are now in a better position to say a bit more about 
what the Gettier problem amounts to. In particular, while in the first instance it was treated 
as the challenge of explaining how we go about fixing the traditional tripartite account of 
knowledge, once we recognise that there is no easy fix in this regard a deeper construal of the 
Gettier problem emerges. This concerns our very notion of knowledge. Gettier cases highlight 
the point that when one knows one’s cognitive success⎯i.e., one’s true belief⎯ought not to 
be just down to luck in any significant way. Instead, it should be arising out of our cognitive 
agency.  
 This is exactly what goes wrong in Gettier-style cases, and thus why the tripartite 
account of knowledge is unsustainable as it stands. That is, we might have initially thought 
that having a justification, even a fallible one, would ensure that our beliefs are due to our 
cognitive agency in such a way that they are not simply down to luck. And yet the good-luck-
bad-luck structure of the Gettier-style cases exposes how one can have a justified true belief 
and yet the truth of one’s belief is entirely down to luck and nothing to do with one’s 
manifestation of cognitive agency. Roddy is manifesting his cognitive agency by using his 
reliable perceptual faculties to pick out (what he takes to be) the sheep before him. And he 
ends up with a true belief, but the truth of his belief is just down to the good epistemic luck 
that there happens to be a sheep in the field hidden from view behind the sheep-shaped 
object that he is looking at. Similarly, Barney is manifesting his cognitive agency by using his 
reliable perceptual faculties to pick out the barn before him. And he ends up with a true 
belief, but the truth of his belief is just down to the good epistemic luck that he happens to be 
looking at the one genuine barn in the vicinity. And so on.  
 If this is the right way of characterising the Gettier problem, then it suggests that our 
natural way of thinking about knowledge is in terms of a cognitive success that is not down to 
luck, but is rather in some substantive way due to our manifestation of cognitive ability. This 
raises some interesting questions about why we think about knowledge in this fashion. 
Moreover, given that the moral of the Gettier problem is that (fallible) justification cannot fit 






3. SCEPTICISM ABOUT THE ANALYTICAL PROJECT 
 
Interestingly, however, while there has been a thriving philosophical industry devoted to 
resolving the Gettier problem, there is also a growing mood of scepticism about the very 
possibility⎯and even desirability⎯of offering such a solution. There are various sources of 
this scepticism. One source of scepticism is not specific to the analytical project in 
epistemology, but rather concerns all analytical projects in philosophy. Perhaps they are all 
wrong-headed, in that no philosophically interesting notion can be made subject to such an 
account? One might, for example, advance broadly Wittgensteinian reasons in support of this 
claim.16  
 Whatever the rationale for this sceptical line, I think we can fairly set it to one side for 
our purposes, given that it is not specific to the analytical project in epistemology. Moreover, 
it is also notable that this way of critiquing the analytical project tends to take it as given that 
what it would take to resolve this project is a non-circular set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. But it is far from clear that our ambitions should be nearly so ambitious. An 
analysis of knowledge might well be informative even though it inter-defined several notions, 
and hence was not ultimately non-circular. Nonetheless, such an account might cast a lot of 
light onto the nature of these notions and how they relate to one another. Conversely, it is 
also worth noting that non-circular analyses of knowledge can sometimes be uninformative, as 
when they are ad hoc, so it is not as if eliminating circularity is a guarantee of a good analysis 
anyway.17  
 A more interesting sceptical line regarding the analytical project for our 
purposes⎯and which is specific to knowledge⎯arises out of the post-Gettier literature itself. 
It involves a kind of pessimistic induction, whereby the continued failure of epistemologists 
engaged in this literature to offer a counterexample-proof analysis of knowledge is meant to 
provide inductive support for the idea that there is something inherently wrong-headed about 
this approach.18 In effect, the idea is that offering an analysis of knowledge is akin to being 
involved in a degenerating research programme.19 Interestingly, this complaint often goes 
hand-in-hand with a distinct sceptical line to the effect that the kinds of analyses of knowledge 
that have been offered in post-Getter epistemology tend to be so convoluted and plain ugly 
that one struggles to see how they could ever be plausible, much less account for why 
knowledge is such a fundamentally important notion.  
 Although these two complaints tend to be run together, I think we would be wise to 
keep them apart. The latter complaint is the weaker of the two. Why can’t an analysis of 
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knowledge be entirely adequate but also ugly? Indeed, why can’t it be simultaneously true 
that knowledge is the kind of thing that we value a great deal, and which also has a complex, 
and thus ugly, analysis?20 What makes this complaint even less compelling is that although 
some solutions that have been offered to the Gettier problem have been complex, there are in 
fact some elegant solutions available too, as we will see in a moment.  
 This last point is also relevant to the pessimistic induction complaint. This is because 
whether such an inductive inference is sensible very much depends on whether we think that 
progress has been made in the post-Gettier literature. That a research programme has failed 
does not itself entail that it is a degenerating research programme, after all, since this could be 
a failure that has been inching towards success. Again, that there are some elegant solutions 
to the problem available in the literature is thus a good ground to be suspicious of this 
sceptical line regarding the analytical project.  
 A final source of scepticism about the analytical project in epistemology arises out of 
the knowledge-first research programme as defended by Timothy Williamson (2000). Unlike the 
other critiques of the analytical project, this is focused on offering a positive defence of an 
alternative approach. Williamson argues that once we recognize the conceptual primacy of 
knowledge with regard to related concepts like belief and evidence, such that we attempt to 
define the latter in terms of the former rather than vice versa, then we will be able to make 
significant headway on the key epistemological problems. This doesn’t just include resolving 
the Gettier problem⎯which effectively disappears on this view, at least insofar as we treat 
that problem as essentially trading on the idea that we should analyse knowledge in terms 
true belief plus some further epistemic conditions⎯but also extends to other difficulties such 
as the problem of radical scepticism.  
 It would take me too far afield to critically engage with knowledge-first epistemology 
here, particularly since it is a proposal that has so many important moving parts.21 Instead, I 
am going to take a slightly different tack, and briefly outline two recent responses to the 
analytical project that I think are plausible. As we will see, in doing so I am not necessarily 
objecting to knowledge-first epistemology, since both of these proposals could be recast along 
knowledge-first lines (even while⎯arguably at any rate⎯remaining potential resolutions of 





4. RESOLVING THE ANALYTICAL PROJECT: 
ROBUST AND ANTI-LUCK VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
We noted above that the moral of the Gettier problem is that one can appropriately manifest 
one’s cognitive agency (such that one’s belief is justified), and in the process be cognitively 
successful (i.e., form a true belief), even though there is a complete disconnect between one’s 
cognitive success and one’s manifestation of cognitive agency. In particular, even despite 
one’s appropriate manifestation of cognitive agency, one’s cognitive success can nonetheless 
be due to luck. If that’s right, then this suggests that the way to respond to the Gettier 
problem is to insist that the cognitive success be appropriately related to the manifestation of 
cognitive agency. 
 How might one do this? One popular proposal⎯advanced, in various guises, by such 
figures as Ernest Sosa (1991; 2007; 2009; 2016), Linda Zagzebski (1996; 1999), and John 
Greco (2009)⎯is to contend that knowledge should be understood as cognitive success that is 
because of the subject’s manifestation of relevant cognitive agency. Take, for example, the 
Roddy case described above. Although Roddy is cognitively successful and appropriately 
manifests cognitive agency (such that his belief is justified), his cognitive success is not in any 
sense because of his manifestation of cognitive agency. Rather, it seems to be because of the 
happenstance that there is a sheep hidden from view in the field, which is nothing to do with 
his cognitive agency.  
 This proposal is known in the literature as robust virtue epistemology. It is a form of virtue 
epistemology in that it defines knowledge in terms of the manifestation of cognitive agency (or 
intellectual virtue, broadly conceived). It is a robust form of the view, in that it only appeals to 
cognitive agency in its account of knowledge, rather than incorporating a non-virtue-theoretic 
condition as well (we will be looking at a non-robust, or modest, form of virtue epistemology in 
a moment).23 There are lots of technicalities regarding how best to understand this 
proposal⎯for example, how best to unpack the ‘because of’ relation which figures in this 
account⎯but we will need to restrict ourselves to making a few general points about the view. 
 First, it is important to note some of the attractive features of the proposal. In 
particular, it is able to offer a striking diagnostic story as to why knowledge might be 
structured in this fashion. The idea is that knowledge is simply a sub-class of the broader 
category of achievements, where an achievement is a success that is because of the subject’s 
manifestation of relevant skillful agency. This explains why one can construct analogous 
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Gettier-style cases outside of epistemology. Take someone firing an arrow at a target. Merely 
hitting the target would not suffice for an achievement, since perhaps there is no skill 
involved. But achievements are also undermined when there is both success and the relevant 
manifestation of skillful agency but where the latter is not because of the former. This is 
where the Gettier-style luck comes into play. An archer who skillfully fires an arrow at a 
target, and hits the target, but only hits the target because (say) a dog jumped up mid-flight, 
snatched the bolt and placed it in the target, would not be credited with an achievement.  
 A further advantage of this proposal is that it seems able to account for the special 
value that we place on knowledge. Achievements, after all, are of special value to us⎯a good 
life is surely one that is rich in achievements, for example⎯and hence it is unsurprising that 
knowledge, qua cognitive achievement, should also be prized.24  
 Robust virtue epistemology thus offers a compelling response to the analytical project, 
and thus the Gettier problem. Note, though, that the analysis of knowledge that it offers may 
well turn out to be non-reductive. Perhaps, for example, there is no way of defining cognitive 
agency that doesn’t appeal to knowledge. In that case, the proposal would be ultimately 
circular. Nonetheless, it could still be an informative, for the reasons given above, and hence 
an adequate response to the analytical project. (Relatedly, notice that robust virtue 
epistemology and knowledge-first epistemology need not be in conflict, in that a proponent of 
the latter could consistently endorse a version of the former).  
 Despite the attractions of robust virtue epistemology, it does face some problems. One 
issue is that although it fares well with regard to standard Gettier-style cases like the Roddy 
scenario, it struggles with some non-standard cases, particularly the Barney example. 
Wouldn’t we naturally describe this case as being one where the subject’s true belief is indeed 
because of his manifestation of relevant cognitive agency (he is looking at a real barn after 
all)? More generally, some have objected that knowledge and achievements come apart in 
terms of their relationship to luck. While an achievement can be fragile⎯in the sense that 
although it is a success that is because of one’s skillful agency, it nonetheless could have easily 
been a failure⎯the same doesn’t seem true of knowledge. The archer who skillfully hits the 
target, but who could have easily missed (had the mischievous dog just described not been 
held back for example), nonetheless exhibits an achievement. But would we ever treat a 
cognitive success that could have very easily been a cognitive failure⎯as in the Barney 
case⎯as an instance of knowledge?25 
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 This problem concerns whether robust virtue epistemology is too weak as an account 
of knowledge, in that it treats some agents as having knowledge which intuitively they do not 
possess. But the account has also been charged with being too strong, in that it seems to 
deprive some agents of knowledge that they genuinely possess. Often, for example, 
testimonial knowledge is gained by, to a large extent, trusting the word of another. But would 
we want to say that in such cases one’s cognitive success is because of one’s manifestation of 
cognitive agency? The point is that although one does manifest some degree of relevant 
cognitive agency in such cases⎯testimonial knowledge isn’t acquired by simply trusting 
anyone, after all⎯nonetheless in such scenarios it seems as if one’s cognitive success is 
because of one’s informant’s manifestation of cognitive agency, if anyone’s. 
 As is usual in philosophy, none of these objections, at least taken alone, are fatal, as 
there are plausible counter moves that the proponent of robust virtue epistemology can make. 
For example, some commentators have observed that the intuition that knowledge is lacking 
in the Barney case is far less strong than in more standard Gettier-style cases, like the Roddy 
scenario. Accordingly, one could reasonably argue that rather than being an objection to the 
proposal, one should instead embrace the consequence that Barney has knowledge in this 
case, on account of the fact that he has exhibited a genuine cognitive achievement.26  
 If one is unconvinced by robust virtue epistemology, however, there is another 
proposal available in the general vicinity. This is a modest form of virtue epistemology, in that 
it doesn’t exclusively define knowledge in terms of a virtue-theoretic condition. According to 
this proposal, we should take seriously the idea that there are two distinct constraints 
operative on knowledge. One is that one’s cognitive success should be appropriately related to 
one’s cognitive agency. The other is that one’s cognitive success shouldn’t be due to luck; 
alternatively, that it shouldn’t be a risky success (i.e., a success that could have very easily 
been a failure). Gettier-style cases demonstrate that one can satisfy the first constraint without 
thereby satisfying the second constraint. Indeed, Barney-style cases seem to demonstrate that 
one can exhibit a genuine cognitive achievement even while lacking knowledge on account of 
the epistemic luck involved. Conversely, it is uncontentious that one’s cognitive success can be 
neither due to luck nor anything to do with one’s manifestation of cognitive agency⎯perhaps 
there are environmental factors that simply guarantee that one’s belief will be true, regardless 
of its epistemic pedigree.  
 If we take these observations seriously, then they suggest a more complex analysis of 
knowledge than that offered by robust virtue epistemology. According to this proposal⎯what 
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is known as anti-luck (or anti-risk) virtue epistemology⎯knowledge is to be understood as non-
lucky/non-risky cognitive success that is significantly attributable to one’s manifestation of 
relevant cognitive agency. Notice that this account is both in one aspect more demanding, 
and in another aspect less demanding, than robust virtue epistemology. It is more demanding, 
in that it is not just one’s cognitive success that needs to be significantly attributable to one’s 
manifestation of relevant cognitive agency, but rather one’s non-lucky/non-risky cognitive 
success. It is less demanding, in that the relation in play here is not the because of relation 
employed by robust virtue epistemology. Instead, all that is demanded is that one’s 
manifestation of relevant cognitive agency should play some significant explanatory role in 
one’s non-lucky cognitive success.27  
 Anti-luck virtue epistemology is designed to avoid the kinds of problems that face 
robust virtue epistemology. Barney-style cases are dealt with on account of how they involve 
lucky success. But one can also account for why cases of testimonial knowledge that involve a 
high degree of trust are genuine, since although the subject’s cognitive agency does not play 
an overarching explanatory role in her cognitive success, it does play a significant explanatory 
role.  
 Anti-luck virtue epistemology is thus able to offer an alterative way of responding to 
the analytical project, and hence the Gettier problem (although, like robust virtue 
epistemology, this doesn’t mean that it is thereby offering a reductive account of knowledge). 
Admittedly, however, anti-luck virtue epistemology lacks the elegant simplicity of robust 
virtue epistemology, and that might be thought to be a substantive strike against it.   
 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
That there exist plausible responses to the analytical project that arose in response to the 
Gettier problem obviously doesn’t entail that this project has been resolved, much less that it 
is a coherent philosophical project to undertake. But it does suggest that we shouldn’t be too 
quick to dismiss this project, or else to take it for granted that it represents a degenerating 
research programme. It also highlights that the challenge that Gettier posed epistemology in 
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